MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25MFD '25

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Talk slides

Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology

Alexey Moskvichev · MKO Systems
Day 1 — Thursday, 11 September 2025: digital forensics day · Scheduled 13:05–13:35 · In the recording 01:40:39–02:18:13

An English deck and the text under the slides

These slides are an English version of the Russian deck shown in the recording: the text the authors set in the presentation has been translated and redrawn in place, while everything captured from a screen — program windows, logs, evidence — is left exactly as it was, in Russian. The fonts are the closest available ones, not the originals. The Russian deck is on the RU version of this page. Under each slide its text is set out for word search and machine reading.

  1. Slide 1 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 101:41:43

    Slide text

    MOSCOW

    FORENSICS

    DAY '25

    ALEXEY MOSKVICHEV

    “APPLYING FORENSIC METHODS TO INVESTIGATE THEFTS COMMITTED WITH NFC TECHNOLOGY”

    MKO SYSTEMS LLC

    IVIL

    100

    MFD

    MFD

  2. Slide 2 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 201:42:53

    Slide text

    NFC IS A SHORT-RANGE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY THAT USES RADIO-FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TO RECOGNIZE OBJECTS AND DEVICES AND TO READ STORED INFORMATION

    Short-range communication

    Fast pairing

    Low power consumption

    Versatile applications

  3. Slide 3 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 301:45:48

    Slide text

    IN 2025, THE NUMBER OF THEFTS USING NFC (OR CARDING) WORLDWIDE GREW MORE THAN THIRTY-FIVE TIMES COMPARED WITH 2024

    Popular carding apps

    NFCGate — relays NFC data from payment cards through compromised phones to fraudulently withdraw cash from ATMs.

    GhostTap — steals card data and loads it into digital wallets for contactless payments.

    8938×

    SuperCard X — covertly collects bank card data and passes it on for fast illegal transactions.

  4. Slide 4 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 401:48:53

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    IN RUSSIA IN 2025, MORE THAN 400 CASES OF CARDING VIA NFCGATE WERE RECORDED, WITH THE AVERAGE AMOUNT STOLEN AROUND 100 THOUSAND RUBLES

    Frequently used criminal schemes:

    500

    Classic scheme — the victim installs an app, holds up the card, enters the PIN — the fraudster with another device withdraws the money at an ATM.

    400

    300

    ТВО

    = 100 thousand rub.

    Reverse scheme — malware on the victim's phone relays the fraudster's card — the victim deposits money at an ATM, topping up the criminal's account.

    · 200

    100

    Aug. 24

    Aug. 25

  5. Slide 5 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 501:52:42

    Slide text

    IN RUSSIA IN 2025, MORE THAN 400 CASES OF CARDING VIA NFCGATE WERE RECORDED, WITH THE AVERAGE AMOUNT STOLEN AROUND 100 THOUSAND RUBLES

    The app has several operating modes:

    Clone Mode — instant cloning and replay of the NFC signal on the device

    • Clone Mode o c a

    Relay Modo Oa

    = Capte Mocie

    -Rapay Mo. 0

    Relay Mode — remote relaying of the signal between several devices over the network

    Wiad ing for Tag

    No capture in progress

    Capture Mode — passive collection of data for analysis

    Replay Mode — replay of previously recorded NFC traffic of one of the devices that exchanged data in the selected session

  6. Slide 6 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 601:57:31

    Slide text

    NFCGATE IN ACTION: MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS USING THE RELAY AND REPLAY MODES

    Stages of an attack using NFCGate in its pure form:

    Social engineering

    Relay Mode O

    • Relay Mode °

    Remote installation of NFCGate via a RAT (Remote Access Trojans) Setting up a connection between the victim's and the attacker's devices in Relay Mode

    1) ming to Seated

    Interception of the NFC data of the victim's card

    Obtaining the victim's PIN

    Reuse of the intercepted traffic via Replay Mode to steal money

    NFCGate in Relay Mode on the attacker's side

    NFCGate in Relay Mode on the victim's side

  7. Slide 7 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 702:00:52

    Slide text

    A NEW WAVE OF NFCGATE ATTACKS: MALICIOUS APK FILES EMULATING LEGITIMATE APPS OF BANKS OR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

    Modification of the NFCGate app involves:

    Changing the UI interface

    Hiding push notifications

    • Добро пожаловать

    гос

    услуги

    Гос Услуги Верификаци...

    Changing package and app names

    Changing the format of the collected data

    Requesting the PIN of the victim's bank account when the app starts

    ФЕДЕРАЛЬНАВ

    СЛУЖБА

  8. Slide 8 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 802:02:01

    Slide text

    CASE

    INCIDENT OUTLINE (22.01.2025)

    A call on Telegram from an unknown person posing as a law enforcement officer

    Pretext:

    “Keeping the money safe”

    Attacker's actions:

    A request to install an unknown app

    Instructions to launch it and hold a bank card up to the phone

    Advice to delete the app

    Result:

    Withdrawal of 230,000 rub. from the card at an ATM by a third party

    Subject of the examination:

    Redmi Note 11S mobile phone

  9. Slide 9 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 902:03:02

    Slide text

    DURING THE EXAMINATION A FILE “VTB (1).APK” WAS FOUND, DETECTED AS HEUR:TROJAN.ANDROIDOS.NFCGATE.A

    Steps:

    MK Expert Plus → the “MTK Android” method

    Antivirus scan of the extracted data

    Identifying the suspicious file:

    Обнаружен 1 объект Выберите действие для обнаруженных объектов:

    ) Скопировать всё в карантин

    • Нейтрализовать всё

    Пропустить всё

    • По умолчанию

    HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.NfcGate.a

    (media\0\Android\data\org.telegram.messenger\fles\Telegram) Telegram Fies\BT (1).apk

    Троянская программа

    MD5:

    59A07FE32FDFBF930152BE488975174F

    SHA256: 8F575C92EAFE370AESF82C681CD4F652F33F31A83A00D3976C9E7CEC40D27B08

    Fig. 1

    the file “VTB (1).apk” was found, with the modification date 22.01.2025 10:20

    the threat type was identified — HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.NfcGate.a

    Имя

    media\0\Android \data\org.telegram.messenger\files\Telegram\ Telegram Files\

    Сжатый Создан

    Размер

    Изменен

    the file's location — the directory the Telegram messenger uses to store received files and documents

    .nomedia

    B16 (1).apk

    0 2025-01-19 15:29

    8 271 671

    2025-01-22 10:20

    Fig. 2

    2

    7146 137

  10. Slide 10 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 1002:04:08

    Slide text

    TRACING HOW THE FILE “VTB (1).APK” REACHED THE DEVICE THROUGH THE FILE_TO_PATH.DB AND CACHE4.DB DATABASES OF THE TELEGRAM MESSENGER IN MK EXPERT PLUS

    Steps:

    L SQL Editor

    4 path

    message_d message_type

    vE fle_to_path.do

    storege /emulated/0/Android/dato/org.telegram.messenger/fles/Telegram/TelegramFles, 816(1) a **** 1330

    > Epoths > peths_by_dolog_id

    424 222

    file_to_path.db → path_by_dialog_id → established the Telegram user ID 7****, from whom the file “VTB (1).apk” was received

    Fig. 3

    • so. Edtor vE fle_to_asth.do

    **** 93 2

    /stor age/emulated/0/Andraid/data/org.telegrem.messenger/fies/Telegram/TelegramFiles/8T6(D.ok 0

    E oxx

    file_to_path.db → paths → established the ID 52****93 of the downloaded file “VTB (1).apk”

    424 222

    Fig. 4

    qcache4.db → downloading_documents → by ID 52****93 the message receipt date 22.01.2025 10:20:44 was established, matching the modification date of the file “VTB (1).apk”

    qcache4.db → users → by ID 7**** the user name “1****” and the account name “ro****” were established

    user_settings

    users

    TRucers data

    Fig. 5

    Guid

    202

    121 508

    Fig. 6

    name

    110****

  11. Slide 11 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 1102:05:34

    Slide text

    ANALYSIS OF THE DECOMPILED CODE SHOWED THAT ITS FUNCTIONS (AND EVEN THE IDENTIFIER) MATCH THOSE OF THE LEGITIMATE NFCGATE APP

    Steps:

    Manifest.xml contained the app identifier de.tu_darmstadt.seemoo.nfcgate with the name “VTB Protection”

    v@ BT6 (1).apk.jdb2

    <}xn1 version*"1,e" encoding-"UTF-§"?> manifest

    ve 8T6 (1).apk v. de.tu_darmstadt.seemoo.nfcgate

    android: conpilesdkversionCodenane="15"

    x Manifest

    android: versionCode="15)

    e Certificate •* Certificate =2 (v2) • Bytecode

    Fig. 7

    Code comparison → the functions match the legitimate NFCGate app at

    https://github.com/nfcgate/nfcgate

    v 2 BT6 (1).apk.jdb2 v • ВТБ (1).apk v.@de.tu_darmstadt.seemoo.nfcgate

    x Manifest

    Fig. 8

    android: debuggable="true"

    android: extractativelibs="true"

    android: label="estring/app_name

    Discovery of the server address ***.***.***.**4 to which the intercepted NFC data was sent

    * public.xml X) strings.xml * styles.xml

    kstring name«"app nal

    1а 0/string

    >com.google.a

    Fig. 9

    this. asessiontumber = 0;

    Fig. 10

  12. Slide 12 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 1202:06:23

    Slide text

    FROM RECEIPT TO DELETION — A FORENSIC TIMELINE OF THE MALWARE

    Steps:

    • portable_geller ****@gmail.com.db →

    geller_key_table in /data/data/com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox/ databases

    contains the app installation history 22.01.2025 10:33:18, 23.01.2025 11:15:41 and 23.01.2025 11:17:19

    → SQL Editor

    > El andrad, metadets • seler_500,004 > Fooler _dosabase, info_table > Epeter fle table En peder_ber Joble

    • DEVICE, INSTALLED APPS

    Fig. 11

    23.01.2025 11:15:41

    LogToDump.log in

    /data/user_de/0/ com.google.android.permissioncontroller/files

    records two uninstalls: 23.01.2025 11:16 and 23.01.2025 11:41

    He Tools Theme Melt

    Fig. 12

  13. Slide 13 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 1302:07:05

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    FROM RECEIPT TO DELETION — A FORENSIC TIMELINE OF THE MALWARE

    Steps:

    package-usage.list in /system/ contains information about the start of the com.android.nfc system service 23.01.2025 11:37

    - uca (lea Thel ATC © тып setue DaNO

    unt ml

    Exas01 23 11a7.27.427300

    tamar

    -Numeie

    5737632247527

    208036800-8430

    Fig. 13

    An image file recording a withdrawal of 230,000 rub. on 23.01.2025 14:39 in a directory linked to mobile banking confirmed the theft

    = ВТБ

    Снятие наличных в банкомате

    Банкомат

    Статус

    Дата операции

    Номер карты

    Счет списания

    Номер банкомата

    23.01.2025, 14:39

    Pe. 1

    Сумма операции

    230 000 ₽

    Банк ВТБ (ПАО) Операция выполне

    Fig. 14

  14. Slide 14 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 1402:07:54

    Slide text

    SIMPLE RULES THAT WILL HELP PROTECT YOU FROM CARDING

    Install apps only from official stores (RuStore, Google Play)

    Do not give your CVV and PIN codes to strangers and do not enter them on suspicious sites or in apps

    Z-NFC

    98,8899 $9173 26LLº

    If you receive a link to install or update a banking app, call the bank's hotline and check that the offer is genuine

    If the card is compromised, block it at once through the hotline or the banking app

  15. Slide 15 — Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology
    Page 1502:08:30

    Slide text

    The financial abyss is the deepest of all abysses, you can fall into it all your life.

    O. Bender