# Applying forensic methods to investigate thefts committed with NFC technology Alexey Moskvichev · MKO Systems Slides · https://2025.moscow-forensics-day.workers.dev/en/slides/05-moskvichev-forenzika-nfc An English version of the Russian deck shown in the recording: the text set by the authors is translated and redrawn in place, everything captured from a screen is left as it was. --- ## Page 1 — 01:41:43 MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25 ALEXEY MOSKVICHEV “APPLYING FORENSIC METHODS TO INVESTIGATE THEFTS COMMITTED WITH NFC TECHNOLOGY” MKO SYSTEMS LLC IVIL 100 MFD MFD ## Page 2 — 01:42:53 NFC IS A SHORT-RANGE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY THAT USES RADIO-FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TO RECOGNIZE OBJECTS AND DEVICES AND TO READ STORED INFORMATION Short-range communication Fast pairing Low power consumption Versatile applications ## Page 3 — 01:45:48 IN 2025, THE NUMBER OF THEFTS USING NFC (OR CARDING) WORLDWIDE GREW MORE THAN THIRTY-FIVE TIMES COMPARED WITH 2024 Popular carding apps NFCGate — relays NFC data from payment cards through compromised phones to fraudulently withdraw cash from ATMs. GhostTap — steals card data and loads it into digital wallets for contactless payments. 8938× SuperCard X — covertly collects bank card data and passes it on for fast illegal transactions. ## Page 4 — 01:48:53 IN RUSSIA IN 2025, MORE THAN 400 CASES OF CARDING VIA NFCGATE WERE RECORDED, WITH THE AVERAGE AMOUNT STOLEN AROUND 100 THOUSAND RUBLES Frequently used criminal schemes: 500 Classic scheme — the victim installs an app, holds up the card, enters the PIN — the fraudster with another device withdraws the money at an ATM. 400 300 ТВО = 100 thousand rub. Reverse scheme — malware on the victim's phone relays the fraudster's card — the victim deposits money at an ATM, topping up the criminal's account. · 200 100 Aug. 24 Aug. 25 ## Page 5 — 01:52:42 IN RUSSIA IN 2025, MORE THAN 400 CASES OF CARDING VIA NFCGATE WERE RECORDED, WITH THE AVERAGE AMOUNT STOLEN AROUND 100 THOUSAND RUBLES The app has several operating modes: Clone Mode — instant cloning and replay of the NFC signal on the device • Clone Mode o c a Relay Modo Oa = Capte Mocie -Rapay Mo. 0 Relay Mode — remote relaying of the signal between several devices over the network Wiad ing for Tag No capture in progress Capture Mode — passive collection of data for analysis Replay Mode — replay of previously recorded NFC traffic of one of the devices that exchanged data in the selected session ## Page 6 — 01:57:31 NFCGATE IN ACTION: MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS USING THE RELAY AND REPLAY MODES Stages of an attack using NFCGate in its pure form: Social engineering Relay Mode O • Relay Mode ° Remote installation of NFCGate via a RAT (Remote Access Trojans) Setting up a connection between the victim's and the attacker's devices in Relay Mode 1) ming to Seated Interception of the NFC data of the victim's card Obtaining the victim's PIN Reuse of the intercepted traffic via Replay Mode to steal money NFCGate in Relay Mode on the attacker's side NFCGate in Relay Mode on the victim's side ## Page 7 — 02:00:52 A NEW WAVE OF NFCGATE ATTACKS: MALICIOUS APK FILES EMULATING LEGITIMATE APPS OF BANKS OR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Modification of the NFCGate app involves: Changing the UI interface Hiding push notifications • Добро пожаловать гос услуги Гос Услуги Верификаци... Changing package and app names Changing the format of the collected data Requesting the PIN of the victim's bank account when the app starts ФЕДЕРАЛЬНАВ СЛУЖБА ## Page 8 — 02:02:01 CASE INCIDENT OUTLINE (22.01.2025) A call on Telegram from an unknown person posing as a law enforcement officer Pretext: “Keeping the money safe” Attacker's actions: A request to install an unknown app Instructions to launch it and hold a bank card up to the phone Advice to delete the app Result: Withdrawal of 230,000 rub. from the card at an ATM by a third party Subject of the examination: Redmi Note 11S mobile phone ## Page 9 — 02:03:02 DURING THE EXAMINATION A FILE “VTB (1).APK” WAS FOUND, DETECTED AS HEUR:TROJAN.ANDROIDOS.NFCGATE.A Steps: MK Expert Plus → the “MTK Android” method Antivirus scan of the extracted data Identifying the suspicious file: Обнаружен 1 объект Выберите действие для обнаруженных объектов: ) Скопировать всё в карантин • Нейтрализовать всё Пропустить всё • По умолчанию HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.NfcGate.a (media\0\Android\data\org.telegram.messenger\fles\Telegram) Telegram Fies\BT (1).apk Троянская программа MD5: 59A07FE32FDFBF930152BE488975174F SHA256: 8F575C92EAFE370AESF82C681CD4F652F33F31A83A00D3976C9E7CEC40D27B08 Fig. 1 the file “VTB (1).apk” was found, with the modification date 22.01.2025 10:20 the threat type was identified — HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.NfcGate.a Имя media\0\Android \data\org.telegram.messenger\files\Telegram\ Telegram Files\ Сжатый Создан Размер Изменен the file's location — the directory the Telegram messenger uses to store received files and documents .nomedia B16 (1).apk 0 2025-01-19 15:29 8 271 671 2025-01-22 10:20 Fig. 2 2 7146 137 ## Page 10 — 02:04:08 TRACING HOW THE FILE “VTB (1).APK” REACHED THE DEVICE THROUGH THE FILE_TO_PATH.DB AND CACHE4.DB DATABASES OF THE TELEGRAM MESSENGER IN MK EXPERT PLUS Steps: L SQL Editor 4 path message_d message_type vE fle_to_path.do storege /emulated/0/Android/dato/org.telegram.messenger/fles/Telegram/TelegramFles, 816(1) a **** 1330 \> Epoths > peths_by_dolog_id 424 222 file_to_path.db → path_by_dialog_id → established the Telegram user ID 7****, from whom the file “VTB (1).apk” was received Fig. 3 • so. Edtor vE fle_to_asth.do **** 93 2 /stor age/emulated/0/Andraid/data/org.telegrem.messenger/fies/Telegram/TelegramFiles/8T6(D.ok 0 E oxx file_to_path.db → paths → established the ID 52****93 of the downloaded file “VTB (1).apk” 424 222 Fig. 4 qcache4.db → downloading_documents → by ID 52****93 the message receipt date 22.01.2025 10:20:44 was established, matching the modification date of the file “VTB (1).apk” qcache4.db → users → by ID 7**** the user name “1****” and the account name “ro****” were established user_settings users TRucers data Fig. 5 Guid 202 121 508 Fig. 6 name 110**** ## Page 11 — 02:05:34 ANALYSIS OF THE DECOMPILED CODE SHOWED THAT ITS FUNCTIONS (AND EVEN THE IDENTIFIER) MATCH THOSE OF THE LEGITIMATE NFCGATE APP Steps: Manifest.xml contained the app identifier de.tu_darmstadt.seemoo.nfcgate with the name “VTB Protection” v@ BT6 (1).apk.jdb2 <}xn1 version*"1,e" encoding-"UTF-§"?> manifest ve 8T6 (1).apk v. de.tu_darmstadt.seemoo.nfcgate android: conpilesdkversionCodenane="15" x Manifest android: versionCode="15) e Certificate •* Certificate =2 (v2) • Bytecode Fig. 7 Code comparison → the functions match the legitimate NFCGate app at https://github.com/nfcgate/nfcgate v 2 BT6 (1).apk.jdb2 v • ВТБ (1).apk v.@de.tu_darmstadt.seemoo.nfcgate x Manifest Fig. 8 android: debuggable="true" android: extractativelibs="true" android: label="estring/app_name Discovery of the server address ***.***.***.**4 to which the intercepted NFC data was sent * public.xml X) strings.xml * styles.xml kstring name«"app nal 1а 0/string \>com.google.a Fig. 9 this. asessiontumber = 0; Fig. 10 ## Page 12 — 02:06:23 FROM RECEIPT TO DELETION — A FORENSIC TIMELINE OF THE MALWARE Steps: • portable_geller ****@gmail.com.db → geller_key_table in /data/data/com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox/ databases contains the app installation history 22.01.2025 10:33:18, 23.01.2025 11:15:41 and 23.01.2025 11:17:19 → SQL Editor \> El andrad, metadets • seler_500,004 > Fooler _dosabase, info_table > Epeter fle table En peder_ber Joble • DEVICE, INSTALLED APPS Fig. 11 23.01.2025 11:15:41 LogToDump.log in /data/user_de/0/ com.google.android.permissioncontroller/files records two uninstalls: 23.01.2025 11:16 and 23.01.2025 11:41 He Tools Theme Melt Fig. 12 ## Page 13 — 02:07:05 FROM RECEIPT TO DELETION — A FORENSIC TIMELINE OF THE MALWARE Steps: package-usage.list in /system/ contains information about the start of the com.android.nfc system service 23.01.2025 11:37 - uca (lea Thel ATC © тып setue DaNO unt ml Exas01 23 11a7.27.427300 tamar -Numeie 5737632247527 208036800-8430 Fig. 13 An image file recording a withdrawal of 230,000 rub. on 23.01.2025 14:39 in a directory linked to mobile banking confirmed the theft = ВТБ Снятие наличных в банкомате Банкомат Статус Дата операции Номер карты Счет списания Номер банкомата 23.01.2025, 14:39 Pe. 1 Сумма операции 230 000 ₽ Банк ВТБ (ПАО) Операция выполне Fig. 14 ## Page 14 — 02:07:54 SIMPLE RULES THAT WILL HELP PROTECT YOU FROM CARDING Install apps only from official stores (RuStore, Google Play) Do not give your CVV and PIN codes to strangers and do not enter them on suspicious sites or in apps Z-NFC 98,8899 $9173 26LLº If you receive a link to install or update a banking app, call the bank's hotline and check that the offer is genuine If the card is compromised, block it at once through the hotline or the banking app ## Page 15 — 02:08:30 The financial abyss is the deepest of all abysses, you can fall into it all your life. O. Bender