MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25MFD '25

Slides / 15 of 19

Talk slides

How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided

Konstantin Titkov · Gazprombank
Day 2 — Friday, 12 September 2025: information security day · Scheduled 14:20–14:50 · In the recording 06:58:14–07:26:12

An English deck and the text under the slides

These slides are an English version of the Russian deck shown in the recording: the text the authors set in the presentation has been translated and redrawn in place, while everything captured from a screen — program windows, logs, evidence — is left exactly as it was, in Russian. The fonts are the closest available ones, not the originals. The Russian deck is on the RU version of this page. Under each slide its text is set out for word search and machine reading.

  1. Slide 1 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
    Page 106:59:16

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    MOSCOW

    FORENSICS

    DAY '25

    MIl

    KONSTANTIN TITKOV

    “HOW NOT TO END UP NEEDING FORENSICS, AND WHAT TO DO IF IT CAN’T BE AVOIDED”

    MFD MFD

  2. Slide 2 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Slide text

    What to do when everything is encrypted and stolen

    Konstantin Titkov

    Head of subsidiary cybersecurity centre, Gazprombank

    Cyberdom ambassador

    09.2025

  3. Slide 3 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    What this talk is about

    What's wrong with the typical IT BCDR plan?

    Emergency actions

    Who can help, and how

    Stages of incident response What to do afterwards If personal data leaks How to prepare so it doesn't hurt THAT much

    P.S. These recommendations are intended for IT and security teams of SMB and are designed for fast and effective incident response involving an external expert organization, and are not addressed to DFIR (Digital Forensic and Incident Response) or SOC (Security Operations Center) experts of large and the largest companies, since such experts are professionals in their field and are guided in their work by industry-specific recommendations and standards, a small

    of which is mentioned in

    part

    this talk.

    P.P.S. The recommendations cannot be absolutely applicable to all possible cases

    and cannot

    guarantee a perfect outcome of actions when responding to a security incident.

    2

  4. Slide 4 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    07.2025, hot on the heels of successful attacks

    Target and incident date

    Incident, officially

    Consequences and recovery

    Beverage producer and federal retail chain,

    14 July

    “... the group suffered an unprecedented cyberattack – a large-scale, coordinated operation carried out by hackers...”

    Financial losses, data loss, reputational damage, customer churn Recovery: about two weeks, full recovery – a month

    Major airline,

    27 July

    Federal pharmacy chain,

    29 July

    Financial losses, data loss, reputational damage, regulatory inspections, possible liability of officials

    “... owing to a failure in the IT infrastructure the airline is making a forced adjustment to its flight schedule, including by partially cancelling flights...”

    Recovery: several days, some functions unavailable Financial losses, data loss, reputational damage, customer churn

    “We faced a serious technical failure caused by a hacker attack. As a result, the work of the pharmacies was disrupted..”

    Recovery: more than two weeks

    Next organization (date to be confirmed...)

    To be disclosed later

    Assessment pending

    ELE-level events are likely (Extinction Level Event), when an organization's activity cannot or should not be restored: total loss of critical production assets, including their physical destruction

    Critically important: prepare to deal with an attack's aftermath before the attack itself starts

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  5. Slide 5 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    The main goal – restore operations as soon as possible

    Stopping at this goal alone – a mistake!

    What gets forgotten:

    Kick the attacker out

    Find out how they got in

    Prevent repeat intrusion

    Identify all attack consequences

    Minimize the damage

    (customers, counterparties, reputation, fines...)

    “We caught the ransomware!” an incorrect statement

  6. Slide 6 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    There is a plan, but the wrong one

    IT incident: human error or technical failure

    Recovery in a few hours (recovering data and individual IT infrastructure elements is practised and honed)

    Security incident: targeted deliberate malicious action on all or any elements of the infrastructure and the personnel, at any time and adaptively – allowing for counter-actions

    Recovery in several days / weeks

    Time is spent on: panic / pointless actions making the decision to respond incident response restoring the IT infrastructure

    restoring data

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  7. Slide 7 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Friday and public holidays

    An incident is the finale of a chain of events, the last step Act immediately, quickly and effectively (even at night)

    Readiness for an incident matters

    Rely on your own groundwork and on on-duty staff

    The ability to bring in help – priceless!

    (and cheaper than downtime)

  8. Slide 8 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    No recommendations exist – let's make them!

    Konstantin Titkov, head of subsidiary cybersecurity centre, Gazprombank; Cyberdom ambassador

    Sergey Golovanov, chief expert, Kaspersky Lab JSC

    Anton Velichko, head of the Digital Forensics and Malware Research Lab, F6 Ilya Zuev, VP for cybersecurity, MTS Bank Colleagues who asked questions and shared their experience

  9. Slide 9 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    How could this even happen?

    VPN, RDP, SSH, OWA, Jira, Confluence, Gitlab, Sharepoint etc. - an unpatched vulnerability or password guessing

    Phishing, including from trusted addresses Compromise of trusted relationships

    WEB application - vulnerability Supply chain attack

    Insider threat actor

    And so on...

  10. Slide 10 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Should you pay the ransom?

  11. Slide 11 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Emergency actions

    Check online banking operations

    Do not power off and do not reboot Isolate valuables / backups and their media

    Who's in charge? And the other responders Communications OUTSIDE the affected infrastructure

    Define realistic goals

    Take “snapshots”

    Perform DFIR

    Examine the outbound traffic

    Consider network isolation

    Arrange the staff's working schedule Support the employees involved

    Go to law enforcement

    Bring in IT contractors

    Inform customers and partners

    A “stub page” on the site

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  12. Slide 12 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Roles in handling a security incident

    Decision maker

    Work coordinator

    Security

    IT

    Lawyer

    PR/Marketing

    • HR

    If personal data leaks, also those responsible for:

    personal data processing

    personal data security

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  13. Slide 13 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Need help?

    Choice of company (-ies), engagement mode, number of experts, date/time

    Address, contacts, passes, parking, letters of guarantee, NDA Kick-off meeting Analysis of compromised hosts, HDDs (imaging for analysis) Search for entry points, all affected hosts and implants (RAT) Report preparation

    With 2 DFIR experts the mode is 24/7: 8 hours an expert works alone, 8 - together with a partner, 8 for rest.

    Ensure the same working mode!

    Need it faster – need more DFIR experts Better discuss timelines and rates before the experts arrive

    NKTsKI (National Coordination Center for Computer Incidents) https://www.cert.gov.ru/abuse/

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  14. Slide 14 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    What to prepare?

    Workplaces (desk/chair/light/power/coffee machine...)

    Chat OUTSIDE the corporate messenger with the necessary people (IT, security, management, lawyer, marketing/PR, ...) “Silence mode” in the internal network, mail, messengers (if they were logged into from the corporate network) Synchronized working hours for IT/security staff and DFIR experts Cancellation of leave, business trips, resignations

    Compensation for overtime

    The chat's confidentiality is critically important!

  15. Slide 15 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Stage 1: Preparing for an incident

    Logs – they exist and are secure (scope, location, depth)

    Disks – accessible (find them, hold them, remove protection)

    Artifacts – can be collected (availability, rights, passwords)

    Reserves – sufficient and available

    Backups – complete (data + software) and secure

    (and there's what to restore them with and onto!)

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  16. Slide 16 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Stage 2: Identifying the incident

    • Threat Intelligence

    • SOC/SIEM

    • MDR

    • EDR/XDR

    • AV

    IT monitoring system (security tools being disabled)

    Screen of an encrypted computer (if you didn't bother with the items above)

    Telegram/MAX channels... (if you're on vacation)

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  17. Slide 17 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Stage 3: Containment

    Do NOT cut the power! Do NOT reboot!

    BUT disconnect from the LAN:

    Virtual machines

    Physical machines

    Wi-Fi and other interfaces

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  18. Slide 18 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Stage 4. Cleanup

    Removing trojans/implants/web shells/RAT etc. Installing security updates (for entry points + the latest)

    Restoring security tools Changing passwords:

    domain and system accounts. Kerberos – x2 and local ones, in DBMS, VPN, applications... and SSH/SSL keys too.

    and web service certificates. and passwords/keys in your online banking.

    and in internet services and personal accounts. Change ALL passwords, basically!

    Check the list of accounts. Including system ones.

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  19. Slide 19 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Stages 5-6: Recovery and lessons learned

    Restoring from backups

    Turning interfaces back on

    Report on the incident and the response

    Recommendations to NOT repeat it

    Work plan

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  20. Slide 20 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Does all this take long?

    Rough timeline estimates:

    Ransomware not launched yet? From 2 hours.

    Analysis of a couple of HDDs – 1 day

    100 - 200 hosts - 1 week of work for 1 expert 1000 - 2000 hosts - 2 weeks for 2 experts 50,000 - 150,000 hosts - 2 months of work by combined teams

    Maybe online?

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  21. Slide 21 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Online is possible

    Online is possible if you can collect logs, evidence etc. The experts will study the data and request what's missing

    Online IR can be cheaper in terms of expert rates no travel and business trip costs!

    BUT: without coordinated, fast and expert work on the client's side DFIR can take longer and even cost more than offline!

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  22. Slide 22 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Is that all? No, unfortunately...

    Going to law enforcement

    Complaint materials

    DFIR report

    KUSP

    Seizure

    Opening a criminal case

    Certificate recognizing the company as victim

    Dealing with other government bodies

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  23. Slide 23 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    And that's still not all

    Theft of information and personal data:

    ransom for deleting it

    selling the data

    publishing the data

    Personal data of employees and customers

    Intellectual property

    Contract terms

    Keys and passwords

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  24. Slide 24 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    In case of a personal data leak

    Enquiries from customers, partners, law enforcement.

    In the future - new parts of data previously stolen from you may be published and passed off as a new leak.

    You must be ready to analyze such data in order to either confirm that it's an old leak, or run DFIR again or a Compromise Assessment (CA).

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  25. Slide 25 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    In case of a personal data leak

    So now (and in the future - every time):

    24 hours - notify Roskomnadzor

    72 hours - report on the results of the internal investigation CII entity - notify NKTsKI within 24 hours (GosSOPKA format)

    Under the Central Bank - ASOI FinCERT

    • GDPR (?)

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  26. Slide 26 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    In advance, for each party to be informed

    notification procedure and requirements for data form and content

    primary and backup notification channels

    access to personal accounts

    account for the branch network of your organization / group / holding

    those responsible for drafting, approving and sending reports

    procedure for informing data subjects about the leak and for posting leak information in open sources those responsible for drafting, approving and publishing the information

    agree press release templates in advance

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  27. Slide 27 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Recommendations for reporting on leak response

    The report may consist of the following sections:

    Introduction - the date and time the leak information appeared, the composition of the information claimed and the information actually published by the attackers

    Investigation results - circumstances and causes of the leak, composition and volume of the leaked data or of data that could have leaked, whether data subjects' interests may suffer from the leak as projected onto the organization's services, whether the culprits were identified and what measures were taken against them

    Conclusion from the analysis of the leaked data – assessment of its authenticity/fakeness and uniqueness given third-party leaks

    Measures taken - tactical and strategic measures with a detailed description

    Better to prepare an exhaustive report!

  28. Slide 28 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    Got it. Can I have a preventive check-up?

    дао дерать ели и тас есть, но того еще не при т лифраструктуру взломали и могут

    What to do if you suspect that your IT infrastructure has been hacked and may be encrypted/destroyed, but this hasn't happened yet.

    What could be such grounds?

    A sense that the IT infrastructure is working incorrectly, for example because of changes made in it with administrative rights that you did not authorize Vulnerable software or services on the external (internet) perimeter that you don't fix promptly.

    A penetration test report with a successful compromise of the infrastructure. And much more...

    In this situation it makes sense to: run a CA (Comromise Assessment) – searching for traces of a breach

    check the security, integrity and availability of your backups (data backup copies)

    Prepare for a future incident

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  29. Slide 29 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    How to prepare? CISO & CIO/CTO Develop a response plan for a successful cyberattack with the most dismal consequences

    Create a reserve of equipment, funds etc.

    Pay special attention to the security of data backups and of the software itself (“3-2-1”)

    Protect the backup system Response exercises

    measure the time Choose DFIR partners in advance If you suspect a breach

    - Comromise Assessment

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  30. Slide 30 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    How to prepare? CEO

    Pass recommendations to IT and security

    Check that everyone can do everything and everyone has everything, the preparatory steps are done

    Estimate the downtime during a security incident

    In an incident, bring in all resources

    Support the employees while the incident's consequences are being dealt with, not punish them

    JO

    A demotivated employee has no interest in incident response, while an employee who let it happen (their fault or not) but fixed the situation is better and more valuable for your company than a new one!

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  31. Slide 31 — How not to end up needing forensics, and what to do if it can't be avoided
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    CEO quick guide:

    Recommendations:

    https://cyberdom.pro/recomendationbig

    https://cyberdom.pro/recomendationceo

    Thank you for your attention!

    Konstantin Titkov

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