MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25MFD '25

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Talk slides

SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined

Natalia Kotova · Forensic Science Centre of the Yaroslavl Regional Police, EKC UMVD
Day 1 — Thursday, 11 September 2025: digital forensics day · Scheduled 15:35–16:05 · In the recording 03:00:18–03:30:22

An English deck and the text under the slides

These slides are an English version of the Russian deck shown in the recording: the text the authors set in the presentation has been translated and redrawn in place, while everything captured from a screen — program windows, logs, evidence — is left exactly as it was, in Russian. The fonts are the closest available ones, not the originals. The Russian deck is on the RU version of this page. Under each slide its text is set out for word search and machine reading.

  1. Slide 1 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 103:01:03

    Slide text

    IMIL

    MOSCOW

    FORENSICS

    DAY '25

    NATALIA KOTOVA

    “SPYNOTE IN ACTION: HOW A MOBILE SPYWARE TROJAN IS CREATED, DEPLOYED AND EXAMINED”

    MFD

    MFD

  2. Slide 2 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 203:01:45

    Slide text

    {SpyNote} in action

    how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined

    NATALIA KOTOVA MOSCOW FORENSICS DAY '25

  3. Slide 3 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 303:02:26

    Slide text

    Nice to meet you!

    expert of the computer and radio engineering examinations and research division, EKC UMVD of Russia for the Yaroslavl Region Kikot Moscow University of the MVD of Russia, 2024. 10.05.05 IT Security in Law Enforcement. Specialization: Computer Forensic Examination

    one year of forensic practice

  4. Slide 4 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 403:03:02

    Slide text

    So who is this SpyNote?

    Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.SpyNote.bz

    Class

    Platform

    Family

    RAT trojan

    Top 10

    Since 2016

    Remote Administration Tool – remote administration or control software

    According to Kaspersky's 2024 report, the verdict is among the 10 most common and steadily growing ones.

    2016 – tools for building it appeared online.

    2022 – the source code of one of the versions leaked

  5. Slide 5 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 503:03:38

    Slide text

    So who is this SpyNote?

    13:09

    Accessibility

    18:44 0

    Accessibility

    3:49

    Accessibility

    Main attack vector

    Безопасность

    Kaspersky

    ЕМИАС +

    bypassing two-factor authentication by intercepting SMS messages

    This App Request Accessibility Service:

    • Click on Enable

    • Enable [Безопасность)

    To unlock premium feature, Follow these steps 1. Click on Enable Button 2. Go to Installed services / Apps 3. Enable Highlighted App

    Enable

    Enable

    Enable

    Disguise methods

    using the names and icons of legitimate apps hiding the app in the list of installed apps

  6. Slide 6 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 603:04:25

    Slide text

    The apk file builder

    SpeNote 6.4

    Build

    DNS Info Properties

    App Info

    Merging App

    Build

    Build

    Merging App

    App Info

    DNS Info Properties

    Build

    IP

    2

    Delete

    C\Users\qwerty\Desktop\apple-settings.png

    tcp.cloudpub.ru

    Port

    26286

    Pass

    nuil

    Victim Name

    test

    Build

    Build

    Properties

    App Info

    DNS Info

    Merging App

    App Name Настройщик

    Service Name

    test 1|

    Hide Application

    Accessibility(Keylogger)

    Version

    Deactivate icons

    Device Administration

    Permission Root SuperSU

  7. Slide 7 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 703:05:10

    Slide text

    Actions on an infected device

    SpyNote | Cracked By BOu3zizi | https://protection-tips.com/vb/

    Tools

    View

    Help

    Image

    Country

    Model

    Victim Name

    Flag

    Remote Address

    Ver & Api

    SMS & Calls

    test

    10 & 29

    127.0.0.1:54359

    HUAWEI ANA-NX9

    all

    null & null

    File Manager

    SMS Manager

    Calls Manager

    Contacts Manager

    Location Man

    ger

    Account Manager

    Camera Manager

    Shell Terminal

    SMS_Manager_test94df27f28e2f748e

    Address

    Part Of Message

    Name

    Date

    + 79139648469

    null

    Tue May 13 15:35:41 GMT+ 03:00 2025 Хэллоу

    - Calls_Manager_test94df271282f748e

    Call Type

    Duration

    Call Date

    Name

    Number

    +79199544168

    00:00:00

    Tue May 13 15:41:07 GMT+03:00 2025

    null

    null

    Applications

    Microphone

    Keylogger

    Settings

    Victim

    Phone

    Chat

    Contacts_Manager_test94df27f28e2f748e

    Name

    Number

    Connected Via

    88007001606

    com.android.huawei.phone

    Контакт центр

    Контакт 1

    1234567890

    com.android.huawei.phone

    Контакт 2

    12364569870

    com.android.huawei.phone

    Fun

  8. Slide 8 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 803:05:39

    Slide text

    Actions on an infected device

    File_Manager_test16721fc243c90cb2

    File Manager

    /storage/emulated/0

    SMS Manager

    Calls Manager

    Contacts Manager

    Location Manager

    Account Manager

    Camera Manager

    Shell Terminal

    Recently

    File extension

    Last Modified

    Name

    Size

    Android

    Folder Files(3)

    05/09/2025 Fri

    Music

    Folder Files(0)

    05/13/2025 Tue

    (New)

    Download

    Folder Files(1)

    •* Camera_Manager_test94df27f28e2f748e

    test 1

    Folder Files(2)

    Pictures

    Folder Files(0)

    Select Camera:0

    Size:400*400

    Quality:Auto

    Applications

    Microphone

    Keylogger

    Settings

    Victim

    DCIM

    Huawei

    Folder Files(0)

    Folder Files(2)

    Flash Mode:Off

    Foces:Off

    Multi-Capture:Off

    ZOOM:0%

    Phone

    Chat

    Stop

    Fun

    7fps 15.24 KB

  9. Slide 9 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 903:06:14

    Slide text

    Actions on an infected device

    File Manager

    key_logger_test16721fc243c90cb2

    SMS Manager

    Calls Manager

    Contacts Manager

    Location Manager

    Account Manager

    Camera Manager

    Shell Terminal

    Applications

    Microphone

    Keylogger

    Settings

    Victim

    Phone

    Chat

    Ofline

    Online

    null

    qwertyasdff

    qwertyasdffb

    qwertyasdffb

    qwertyasdffbd

    qwertyasdffbd

    Selected 1

    Start

    Stop

    # key_logger_test16721fc243c90cb2

    Start

    Ofline

    Online

    Изображение, (Р)

    Изображение, (W)

    *#06

    6, MNOPCTY

    *#06#

    Изображение, (W)

    IMEI, IMEI1:863725044876496I|

    MEI2:863725044888509SN:VWS0220902000398, OK

    Stop

    Fun

    Selected 1

    Count 163

    Ln 1

  10. Slide 10 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
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    Slide text

    Actions on an infected device

    File Manager

    SMS Manager

    Calls Manager

    Contacts Manager

    Location Manager

    Account Manager

    Camera Manager

    Shell Terminal

    Applications

    Microphone

    Keylogger

    Settings

    Victim

    Phone

    Chat

    Settings_test16721fc243c90cb2

    Phone Info

    Votes and alerts

    Phone bar

    Device Policy Manager

    Screen Lock

    * Settings_test16721fc243c90cb2

    Factory reset

    Add a screen lock password

    Phone Info Votes and alerts

    Device Policy Manager

    Phone bar

    Ej Password Reset

    Screen Lock

    Enter your new password

    Factory reset

    Add a screen lock password Success Password 1234

    Fun

  11. Slide 11 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1103:06:52

    Slide text

    Other SpyNote capabilities

    Location tracking

    Ability to make calls

    Microphone access

    Chat with the user

    Shell terminal

    Access to account details

  12. Slide 12 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1203:07:57

    Slide text

    Standard questions

    Stages of the examination

    1. Are there any files on the mobile phone submitted for examination that are detected by antivirus software?

    Data extraction

    2. Does the mobile phone submitted for examination hold information about installed remote access software?

    3. Does the mobile phone submitted for examination hold call and SMS history, present or deleted?

    4. Does the mobile phone submitted for examination hold a history of messaging via messengers and social networks?

    5. Does the mobile phone submitted for examination hold a history of web pages visited via browsers?

    Scanning with antivirus software

    Static and dynamic analysis

    Reviewing the extracted information

  13. Slide 13 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1303:09:26

    Slide text

    Tasks of static and dynamic analysis

    Static analysis

    Dynamic analysis

    1. Extracting and decompiling the APK

    2. Examining the metadata (AndroidManifest.xml)

    package name, version, minSdk/targetSdk.

    3. Analyzing the app structure (AndroidManifest.xml)

    activities, services, receivers

    4. Identifying protection methods (APKiD)

    obfuscation, packing

    5. Source code analysis

    list of Android APIs used behavioral analysis

    1. Installing and running in an isolated environment

    2. Monitoring the app's behavior

    requested permissions

    interaction with the user

    behavior under different conditions

    3. Network activity analysis

    network connections (TCP/UDP, HTTP/HTTPS) analysis of network packet payloads

    4. File activity analysis

    files created and modified app data

    6. Analysis of resources and strings searching for URLs, IPs, domains, e-mail

  14. Slide 14 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1403:11:37

    Slide text

    Tools

    Static analysis

    Dynamic analysis

    Decompilation

    • apktool • JADX / JADX-GUI • dex2jar • Androguard

    Search and analysis

    • strings • grep • APKiD

    Emulators

    • AndroidStudio (AVD)

    • Genymotion • Nox, LD player

    Traffic analysis

    • Burp Suite • ZAP • Wireshark

    Static + dynamic analysis

    Mobile Security Framework (MobSF)

    Repo: https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security- Framework-MobSF

    Doc: https://molsf.github.io/docs/#/ * docker.

    https://mobsf.live

    automated static analysis

    dynamic analysis with the ability to track app activity

    report generation

  15. Slide 15 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1503:13:52

    Slide text

    Static analysis

    AndroidManifest.xml

    <uses-permission android: name-"android.permission. WRITE CONTACTS" <uses-permission android: name="android.permission. READ_CONTACTS" />

    <manifest package=package name versionName= version>

    ‹uses-permission android: name="android.permission. RECORD_AUDIO" /> <uses-permission android: name="android.permission. READ_SMS" />

    ‹uses-permission›

    <uses-permission android: name-"android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE" ‹uses-permission android: name-"android.permission. CHANGE_WIFI_STATE" />

    the app's permissions (rights) to access various features and data on the device

    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission. READ CALL LOG" /> <uses-permission android: name="android.permission. INTERNET" />

    <uses-permission android: name-"android.permission. READ_PHONE_STATE" <uses-permission android: name="android.permission.CALL PHONE"

    ‹/uses-permission›

    <uses-permission android: name="android.permission. ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" <uses-permission android: name="android.permission.ACCESS

    _FINE_LOCATION" />

    ‹application›

    <uses-permission android: name="android.permission. RECEIVE SMS" /> <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET TASKS" />

    ‹ activity›

    ‹activity android:label-"@string/app_name" android:name="cmf0.c3b5bm90zq-patch.C7" android:

    the app's graphical forms (screens)

    <intent-filter>

    <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />

    ‹/intent-filter›

    ‹ intent-filter›

    intent type

    <category android: name="android. intent.category.LAUNCHER"

    </intent-filter>

    MAIN+LAUNCHER → main activity

    ‹/activity›

    /activity>

    service android:name-"cmf0.c3b5bm90zg.patch.Cl" android:permission="android.permission.E

    ‹service›

    ‹intent-filter›

    <action android: name="android.accessibilityservice.AccessibilityService"

    defines the app's background services

    </intent-filter>

    background service with access to accessibility features

    </ service›

    ‹/service›

    <receiver android: name-"cm10.c3b5bm90zq-patch.c10">

    <receiver›

    <intent-filter>

    <action android:name="android provider. Telephony. SMS RECEIVED" />

    defines the receivers of broadcasts

    </intent-filter>

    monitoring incoming SMS

    </receiver>

    </receiver›

    ‹receiver android:name="cmf0.c3b5bm90zq.patch.c4" android: enabled-"true" android:exp

    ‹/application ›

    ‹intent-filter›

    ‹action android: name=" android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED" />

    ‹/manifest›

    </intent-filter>

    monitoring device startup

    </receiver>

    https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/manifest-intro

  16. Slide 16 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1603:15:40

    Slide text

    Mobile Security Framework – static analysis

    • DECOMPILED CODE

    MobSF

    / APP SCORES

    → FILE INFORMATION

    c/> View Smali

    c/> View Source

    © View AndroidManifest.xml

    * Download Java Code

    * Download Smali Code

    * Download APK

    Static Analyzer

    Information

    * Scan Options

    App Name Настройщик

    •apk

    File Name

    11.67MB

    Package Name cmf0.c3b5bm90zq.patch

    Size

    aelefc20dc6bc4ba3626ad758140db4d

    Main Activity cmf0.c3b5bm90zq.patch.C7

    MD5

    Security Score 44/100

    SHAI cle65053dac4ea59589e9a6a51ff867a8db5157a

    Target SDK 22 Min SDK 10 Max SDK

    Trackers Detection 0/432

    SHA256C6fa95d261908229b1c30034dffdc2f6c466745dd8c7f3f726b9266c8d574aa

    Android Version Name 1.1.1.0 Android Version Code 1

    :APPLICATION PERMISSIONS

    Signer Certificate

    Permissions

    Android API

    PERMISSION

    android. permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION

    Search:

    STATUS

    INFO

    DESCRIPTION

    CODE

    MAPPINGS

    coarse (network-based)

    Access coarse location sources, such as the mobile network database, to determine an approximate

    Show Files

    dangerous

    location

    phone location, where available. Malicious applications can use this to determine approximately where

    you are.

    Browsable Activities

    Security Analysis

    Malware Analysis

    + Reconnaissance

    android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION

    fine (GPS) location

    dangerous

    • ANDROID API

    android.permission.CALL_PHONE

    API

    GPS Location

    Access fine location sources, such as the Global Positioning System on the phone, where available.

    Show Files

    Malicious applications can use this to determine where you are and may consume additional battery

    Search:

    FILES

    Show Files

    Components

    Execute OS Command

    Show Files

    PDF Report

    Starting Activity

    TCP Socket

    Show Files

    Show Files

  17. Slide 17 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1703:17:28

    Slide text

    Mobile Security Framework – static analysis

    Malware Analysis

    nAPKiD ANALYSIS

    Malware Lookup

    APKiD Analysis

    Behaviour Analysis

    Abused Permissions

    Server Locations

    F. BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS

    DEX

    classes.dex

    DETECTIONS

    FINDINGS

    Anti-VM Code

    Compiler

    Search:

    Search:

    DETAILS

    Build.FINGERPRINT check

    Build.MANUFACTURER check

    Build BOARD check

    possible Build.SERIAL check

    dexlib 2.x

    RULE ID

    BEHAVIOUR

    * URLS

    LABEL

    00188

    Get the address of a SMS message

    00191

    00052

    00011

    00049

    00163

    Get messages in the SMS inbox

    Deletes media specified by a content URI(SMS, CALL_LOG, File, etc.)

    Query data from URI (SMS, CALLLOGS)

    Query the phone number from SMS sender

    Create new Socket and connecting to it

    URL

    https://www.google.com

    calllog

    collection

    sms

    cmf0/c3b5bm90zq/patch/C11.java

    sms

    collection

    cmf0/c3b5bm90zq/patch/C10.java

    socket

    cmf0/c3b5bm90zq/patch/C11.java

    cmf0/c3b5bm90zq/patch/C5.java

    FILE

    A STRINGS

    cmf0/c3

    From APK Resource

    • Show all 1365 strings

    From Code

    • Show all 428 strings

  18. Slide 18 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1803:19:19

    Slide text

    Static analysis – searching for network addresses

    Search sources:

    resources (AndroidManifest.xml, <res>, <assets>)

    source code

    Search methods:

    searching for the strings “host”, “port”, “http://”, etc.

    searching by regular expression (ip address) searching by Java methods, e.g. “Socket”, “HttpURLConnection”, “OkHttpClient”

    searching for decoding/decryption methods in the code (e.g. Base64 / XOR / AES)

    ‹ string name=" app_name"›Настройщик‹/string> ‹string name="gp"> 01011</string> ‹string name="h"› tcp. cloudpub. ruk/string> ‹string name="n"> test</string> ‹string name="p"› 26268</ string> ‹string name="ps">null</string> ‹string name="s"> test 1</string> ‹string name="search_menu_title"› Search‹/string› ‹string name="status_bar_notification_info_overflow" ‹string name="v">1.1.1.0‹/string>

    In the test SpyNote v.6.4 apk file the address of the C2 server sits in the resources (res/values/strings.xml)

  19. Slide 19 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 1903:20:46

    Slide text

    Dynamic analysis

    MobSF + AVD (Android 10) + Wireshark

    1:11 ฿

    Настройщик

    Use service

    1:12 ฿

    Activate device admin app?

    Настройщик

    1:48 0 g

    test 1 v

    Name

    Creating the directory /data/media/O/test 1/

    No description provided.

    Use Настройщик?

    Настройщик needs to:

    • Observe your actions Receive notifications when you're interacting with an app.

    CANCEL

    OK

    Activating

    Accessibility Service

    Activating this admin app will allow the арр Настройщик to perform the following operations:

    Erase all data Erase the phone's data without warning by performing a factory data reset.

    Change the screen lock

    Set password rules Control the length and the characters allowed in screen lock passwords and PINs.

    Monitor screen unlock attempts Monitor the number of incorrect passwords typed, when unlocking the screen, and lock the phone or erase all the phone's data if too many incorrect

    passwords are typed

    Lock the screen Control how and when the screen locks.

    Set screen lock password expiration Change how frequently the screen lock password, PIN. or patter must be changed.

    Set storage encryption Require that stored app data be encrypted.

    Disable cameras Prevent use of all device cameras.

    Activate this device admin app

    Activating

    Device Admin App

    1. APK of the app used for binding*

    2. SpyNote log file (keylogger records)

    base.apk

    config27-08-202...

    11.46 MB 1:12 PM

    24.69 kB 1:12 PM

    Text data + Base64

    2DILKVSOHdEUBRCKh3SqOj+wukQudAbiYimTdF1fPU0x/tN/1/dS1b/X7x60YAAAAASUVORK5CYII=10251Activate this device admin app10251com.android.settings1025113:12 PM10250-110251Apps list10251com.google.android.apps.nexuslauncher1025113:12 PM10250-110251Calculator, Calendar,

    Camera, Chrome, clock,

    Contacts, Drive, Files, Gmail, Google, Maps, Messages, Phone, Photos,

    Play Movies & TV, Play Music,

    Settings, Webview Browser Tester, Youtube,

    Настройи10251.google.android.apps.nexuslauncher1025113:12 PM10250-110251Apps list10251com.google.android.apps.nexuslauncher1025113:12 PM10250-110251Package installer10251com.google.android.packageinstaller1025113:12 PM10250-110251Настройщик, For your security, your phone is not allowed to install

    unknown apps from this source., CANCEL,

    SETTINGS10251com.google.android.packageinstaller1025113:12 PM10250-110251Package installer10251com.google.android.packageinstaller1025113:12 PM10250-110251SETTINGS10251com.google.android.packageinstaller1025113:12 PM10250iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABgAAAAYCAYAAADgdz34AAAABHNCSVQICAgIfAhkiAAAA1hJREFUSImNlU9sG0UUx n9vdr12mig0TQE1XJBoJcqB3j1RcUFIXCrEBQ71UiGhXhLqTZzUcVLbat1W6gEJFSEUCYEKFw4IceHMvSABErTc+keg0iUhx PbuPA673 j9eJ82TLNvfvPm+7828mRGeFcuvIEx340d0/AMK9e+2W+67DnS8neAiScaiJR6LHcqBx04 +uEk fwf7YMQj4XCY×SuPS5DJJbT882PJVRrkTCMPtaCalEgZJNW9L4ChrnDIGa+XecMQkt2wuNHDZ1vYE6Z1w6GDnC@uVu voI9yIfuC617VQFg9VGiBUDLT81V8VRxbURsQkt3xD3A5k1jWjZrcaxSQfKCTb8H4MZ/D2WddRfWxjvLhGMM2yN5U9dWUdeJ ifCir1binZAfInL12zPvcPr54wXC+S++ 5PPbPwHw1skx+fi9s4wc2/fu8cqtT8CY4WqCNUPyGBhLPusvsVHLrwT1MkG1zK07d5n1Fwt5p+bmcLdI10pk198GAk+

  20. Slide 20 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 2003:22:09

    Slide text

    Dynamic analysis – network traffic analysis

    Without internet access DNS query for the domain name “tcp.cloudpub.ru”, no response

    7 15.965001000 192.168.232.2

    77 Standard query 0x486c AAAA tcp.cloudpub.ru

    10.0.2.3

    DNS

    The address of our C2 server

    With internet access DNS query for the domain name “tcp.cloudpub.ru”, with a response

    10.0.2.3

    40 35.752435000

    192.168.232.2

    DNS

    77 Standard query 0x4fab AAAA tcp.cloudpub.ru

    10.0.2.3

    132 Standard query response 0x4fab AAAA tcp.cloudpub.ru SOA ns1. reg.ru

    41 35.803319000

    192.168.232.2

    DNS

    192.168.232.2

    77 Standard query 0x0fa8

    A tcp.cloudpub.ru

    10.0.2.3

    42 35.804194000

    DNS

    10.0.2.3

    43 35.862414000

    93 Standard query response 0x0fa8 A tcp.cloudpub.ru A 87.242.106.13

    192.168.232.2

    DNS

    Establishing a TCP connection with “87.242.106.13” and exchanging data

    44 35. 864728000

    76 55016 → 26268 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1360 SACK_PERM TSval=4294962891 TSecr=@ WS=64

    192.168.232.2

    87.242.106.13

    TCP

    87.242.106.13

    192.168.232.2

    60 26268 → 55016 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460

    45 35.909881000

    TCP

    46 35.910227000

    192.168.232.2

    87.242.106.13

    TCP

    56 55016 → 26268

    [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0

    1416 55016 → 26268

    [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=1360

    47 36.942962000

    192.168.232.2

    87.242.106.13

    TCP

    184 55016 → 26268

    ACK] Seq=1361 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=128

    TCP

    [PSH,

    48 36.943365000

    192.168.232.2

    87.242.106.13

    26268 → 55016

    Seq=1 Ack=1361 Win=8760 Len=0

    [ACK]

    36.944045000

    87.242.106.13

    192.168.232.2

    TCP

    56

    49

    56 26268 → 55016 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1489 Win=8760 Len=0

    50

    36.944117000

    87.242.106.13

    192.168.232.2

    TCP

    74 26268 → 55016 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1489 Win=8760 Len=18

    51

    38.112548000

    87.242.106.13

    192.168.232.2

    TCP

    55016 → 26268 [ACK] Seq=1489 Ack=19 Win=65535 Len=0

    52

    38.112843000

    192.168.232.2

    87.242.106.13

    TCP

    56

    63 26268 → 55016 [PSH, ACK] Seq=19 Ack=1489 Win=8760 Len=7

    53 38.553716000

    87.242.106.13

    192.168.232.2

    TCP

    54 38.553985000

    192.168.232.2

    87.242.106.13

    TCP

    56 55016 → 26268 [ACK] Seq=1489 Ack=26 Win=65535 Len=0

    Packet payload

    Gzip signature

    1f 8b 08

    ff

    ff

    1483 • ..

    130

    50

    10

    e3

    00

    00

    31

    34

    38

    33

    00

    00

    00

    00

    00

    00

    00

    ad

    56

    d2

    ab

    7e

    95

    140

    00

    0e

    л. 03-3. .

    5e

    be

    150

    0d

    8b

    30

    84

    00

    8b

    18

    30

    33

    01

    33

    85

    ea

    bf

    bf

    bb

    ba ee

    60

    23

    43

    80

    30

    87

    a7

    9c

    ba

    ba

    e5

    CC

    jpeg

    → unzip → Decode Base64 →

    Model

    Image

    Victim Name

    Country

    Flag

    Remote Address

    test

    127.0.0.1:61018

    GOOGLE.

    The C2 server admin panel

  21. Slide 21 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 2103:23:15

    Slide text

    Forensics

    /data/data/<package name> – the app data directory

    Installation details

    • Установленные приложения \История установок приложений v Время последнего обновления (Москва) ID приложения

    Путь к АРК

    «frosting.db» /data/data/com.android.vending/databases/

    com.whh.premium

    17.12.2024 16:32:50 (UTC+3)

    base.apk

    «verify _apps.db» /data/data/com.android.vending/databases/

    • Установленные приложения \Верифицированные приложения 1/1

    v Название

    Энергосбыт

    ID приложения

    com.whh.premium

    «packages.xml» /data/system/

    package name

    path to the app file

    installation time

    installation initiator

    app installer

    v it package

    -name = com.whh.premium

    --codePath = /data/app/~~5fmOrSm3aKS8E9SKjK9|9w==/com.whh.premium-ITqA8cmV9JJlomuiF-zZYw== -nativeLibraryPath = /data/app/~vw5fmOrSm3aKS8E9SKjK9l9w==/com.whh.premium-ITqA8cmV9JJIomuiF-zZYw==/lit -publicFlags = 945339972 -privateFlags = -1409282048

    Unix Milliseconds (Java Time)

    2024-12-17 16:32:49.0000000 +03:00

    -- ft = 193d4d23fe8

    -ut = 193d4d24462

    Unix Milliseconds (Java Time)

    2024-12-17 16:32:50.1460000 +03:00

    -version = 3000

    -userId = 10366

    ft – time of last modification

    -installer = com.google.android.packageinstaller

    it – time of first installation

    -packageSource = 3

    -installInitiator = com.google.android.packageinstaller • ut – time of last update

    -installOriginator = org.telegram.messenger

    .. loadingProgress = 1

    .- domainSetid = aa070b91-1d0d-4671-874c-7b6e 13391cc4

  22. Slide 22 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 2203:24:12

    Slide text

    Forensics

    Searching by package name

    newbatterystats /data/log/batterystats/ Samsung devices

    +1h20m36s334ms (2) 095 pkginst=57401: "com. iproxy.android" +1h20m36s503ms (2) 095 pkginst=57401: "com.iproxy.android" +1h20m36s594ms (2) 095 pkginst=57401: "com.iproxy.android" +1h20m36s639ms (2) 095 pkqinst=57401: "com.iproxy. android"

    +9h42m55s610ms (2) 060 pkgunin=0: "com.iproxy.android" +9h42m55s666ms (2) 060 pkgunin=0: "com.iproxy.android"

    pm_debug_info.txt /data/log/

    2025-06-13 18:02:41.662: START INSTALL PACKAGE: observer (229554387)

    stagedDir(/data/app/vmdl53600148.tmp} stagedCid(null) pkg(com. example.application) Request from{com.google.android.packageinstaller}

    2025-06-13 19:49:11.541: START DELETE PACKAGE: observer (216981792} pkg(com.example.application), user(0}, caller(10085) flags(2)

  23. Slide 23 — SpyNote in action: how a mobile spyware trojan is created, deployed and examined
    Page 2303:25:05

    Slide text

    Forensics

    Other artifacts

    The built-in antivirus of the “Sberbank” app

    «threats.ab»

    /data/data/ru.sberbankmobile/databases

    SpyNote log

    «log-yyyy-mm-dd.txt»

    /data/media/O/Config/sys/apps/log

    «{"virusName":"HEUR:Trojan- Spy. AndroidOS.SpyNote.bz", objectName""/ data/ app/~~aUtq8Y3Z3RGSyUUJ9fuMuA==/ ate.asking.humanity-J32gBHsvrskliOSBIH

    L_Kw==/base.apk", "fileFul|Path":"/data/app/

    ~~aUtq8Y3Z3RGSyUUJ9fuMuA==/ ate.asking.humanity- J32gBHsvrskliOSBIHL_Kw==/ base.apk", fileHash" null"package Name": "ate.asking.humanity", severityLevel" HIGH", ap plication" true,"adminThreat" false,"cloudCheckF ailed":false}»

    decode from Base64

    Графический интерфейс системы#[Панель уведомлений, RT-10, Развернуть, Bluetooth, Развернуть,. Нажмите для установки режима вибрации. При этом могут также выключиться звуки в службе специальных возможностей., 19:59, чт, 21 нояб., Открыть настройки., NFC, Вибровызов., Bluetooth disconnected., VoLTE для карт SIM1 и SIM2, 90 %, Удалить все уведомления|#5